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1. Introduction

Since the outbreak of violence in Syria, the civil war has claimed well over
100,000 lives, with some estimates putting the current figure nearer to 150,000.1 The
amount of refugees created as a result of the war is now over eight and a half million.2
The situation in Syria represents not only the most disastrous contemporary humanitarian
crisis, but is also the most dangerous in terms of its potential long-term spillover effects
in the region. Located in the heart of the Middle East, an unstable Syria with a large and
ever growing jihadist presence is the sum of all fears for not only Israel and Europe but
also pro-Western Arab countries. Syria’s most prominent jihadist organization, the Nusra
Front, also known as Jabhat-al-Nusra, is in the process of creating a base for Al-Qaeda in
Syria to use as a launching pad for the export of terrorism. Today the Al-Nusra Front is
prominent among the rebel organizations because of its military and financial
capabilities, its effective chain of command and control, and the deep ideological
commitment of its operatives. The successful long-term entrenchment of this group in
Syria poses one of the most serious threats to both regional and global security.
The Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, when longstanding tensions between the
ruling Alawite minority and the Sunni majority were exacerbated by the revolutionary
atmosphere that had taken hold over the Middle East. With uprisings taking place in
Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, small amounts of Syrians initially began protesting
against the Baathist ‘Nizam’, or ‘system’ in Arabic. While these initial, localized protests
1

AP Online, "Syria death toll from rebel infighting," April 11, 2014.

2
Perriello, Tom. “A New Start To U.S. Policy in Syria Can Save Lives.” The Daily Beast. Newsweek/Daily Beast, 17 Feb. 2014 Web.
28 Apr. 2014
.
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took root in the underdeveloped rural areas of Syria, they were aggravated by Bashar-alAssad’s disproportionately heavy handed response, and soon spread throughout the
country. Assad’s specific usage of exclusively Alawite crack squads in quelling the
protests stoked the sectarian flames of the conflict and made the economically
disenfranchised Sunni majority feel existentially threatened. Within a period of months,
protests had turned to violence, and violence into a full-fledged civil war.
More than three years since the Arab Spring began in Syria the conflict has turned
into a proxy war, with the foreign policy objectives of various countries being fought out
on the ground. Syria can no longer be considered a country intact; the Assad regime has
lost effective control of large parts of the country and many of its vital supply lines,
particularly in the North. Various rebel groups, numbering over 150,000 fighters in total,
have emerged all over the country. These rebel groups are split along ideological,
religious, ethnic and regional lines. Due to their considerable division at the outset of the
war the rebel groups were unable to form a centralized, legitimate and representative
command structure, resulting in their cooperation being characterized by a complex web
of shaky alliances and ad-hoc relationships. Western hesitancy to intervene in Syria was
fueled by this fact along with the growing presence/prominence of hardcore Salafi
Jihadist groups within the opposition.
Of these Jihadi rebel groups, one group in particular has risen to the ranks of
prominence by virtue of its effectiveness in fighting the regime; the Al-Nusra Front. As
Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, the Nusra Front is Al-Qaeda’s way of making inroads into
the Arab Spring at large; popularizing Salafi Jihad in a region overflowing with potential
recruits. Throughout the majority of the armed conflict, it has been Jabhat al Nusra that
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has led insurgent attacks on key Syrian military installations; air-defense bases, coastal
and major highway routes in attempts to block supply lines; the vast majority of suicide
attacks in civilian areas; and assassinations on key Government security officials. JN has
distinguished itself from other outfits by being the best equipped, most organized,
consistently well-funded and most importantly, by far the most successful on the ground.
Having been described as the revolution’s ‘elite commando troops’, the Nusra Front
boasts of a dangerous cadre of fighters that are highly experienced, disciplined,
ideologically committed and tactically efficient3. These fighters are gaining valuable
experience in combat, bomb-making, propaganda and counter-intelligence. Most are
developing relationships with fighters from other regions – such as the Persian Gulf,
North Africa and South Asia. In addition, these ties are being used to transport greater
amounts of money, lethal aid and non-lethal material to the Syrian front. 4 It is
undeniable that the Nusra Front currently is and will continue to be one of the more
significant players in Syria. Understanding the origins, goals, composition, structure,
strategy and tactics of the Nusra Front is thus important for a number of reasons, most of
all because of the danger the group presents by way of its unique status; the Nusra Front
has managed to somehow maintain ultimate allegiance to Al Qaeda’s transnational
jihadist ideology while acquiring widespread popular support and/or acceptance within
Syrian anti-government society.
The primary focus of this paper is a group named Jahbat-Al-Nusra, also known as
the Al-Nusra Front, a Salafi-Jihadi Syrian opposition group that is Al-Qaeda’s branch in
Syria This paper will assess the influence of Salafist Jihadi groups linked to Al-Qaeda
3

"Syria revolt attracts motley foreign jihadi corps". Agence France Presse. 18 August 2012
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Jones, Seth. "IISS." Syria's Growing Jihad. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 01 Aug. 2013. Web. 26 Apr. 2014.
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within the Syrian opposition as regional actors. By way of this assessment this paper will
further seek to extrapolate the resultant impacts that Al-Qaeda’s influence in Syria will
have in the future on Middle Eastern Security. The paper will use its analysis of the
growing prominence of Jihadist groups in Syria to highlight the incoherent and oft selfcontradictory nature of U.S Syria policy up till now, and will conclude with some
recommendations for U.S policy in the region.
The civil war and uprising in Syria has made it an ideal nesting ground/battlefront
for Al-Qaeda. While Syria’s strategic location at the heart of the Arab world is one reason
for this, the creation of an environment (vis-à-vis the conflict) that is conducive to AlQaeda infiltration and operations is another. The war in Syria has eroded the foundation
of Syrian society in particularly war-torn areas; governance has broken down,
populations have been displaced and the provision of basic needs to the population has
ceased altogether in some cases. All this has had the effect of creating a vacuum that is
particularly conducive to the absorption of extremist views and behavior. Evidence for
this is found not only in the growing presence of Salafi-Jihadi groups within the
opposition, but also in the statements of Al-Qaeda leaders; in February 2012, Al-Qaeda
Emir Ayman Al Zawahiri called upon “every Muslim and every honorable and free
person in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to go and aid his brothers in Syria”.5
In order to contextualize JN’s (Jahbat-Al-Nusra) presence and growing influence
in Syria, it is important to identify the reasons as to why the opposition was receptive to
Salafist influence in a country in which the majority has historically tended to reject
extremist views. Emphasis will be laid on the fact that it is a combination of existent
Shia-Sunni tensions and the socio-economic conditions of Sunni’s living in rural areas (as
5

Jason Burke, “Al-Qaida leader Zawahiri urges Muslim support for Syrian Uprising,” The Guardian, February 12, 2012.
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opposed to Sunni and Shia mercantile classes living in cities) that allowed for Salafist
ideology to gain momentum in the immediate aftermath of the uprising in Syria
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2. The Syrian Sectarian Dynamic: Reasons for Receptiveness of Opposition to
Salafist Influence

Before delving into analysis of individual groups it is important to understand the
core reasons because of which Salafist groups such as JN were able to gain a foothold
within the opposition. It is pertinent to grasp the causes of this particular phenomenon as
its occurrence is counter-intuitive given the historically moderate and Sufist religious
outlook that is characteristic of Syrian Muslims.

I. Syria’s moderate religious history
While it may be difficult to imagine at this juncture, Syria has historically been a
successful example of peaceful religious co-existence in the Middle East. Home to
ancient Christian communities, a variety of Muslim sects, and several indigenous and
heterodox religions, Syria’s culture has always been more heterogeneous than Arab lands
in the Gulf and North Africa. As fellow ‘People of the Book,’ Christians and Jews (prior
to 1948) lived easily alongside their Muslim neighbors, while the country’s deserts and
mountains provided geographic sanctuary to less protected religious and ethnic minority
groups. Though sectarianism always lurked in its different forms somewhere beneath the
surface, prior to the 2011 uprising, more than 87 percent of Syrians ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly
agreed’ that they always treat members of other faiths with respect according to Gallup
data. Meanwhile, in 2009, another 78 percent of Syrians said that they had a positive
opinion of Christians, while 5 percent said they had a negative opinion. In pre-conflict
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Syria, it was common for friends of other religions to attend each other’s weddings and
funerals, and it was considered rude to inquire into someone’s religious background 6
Thus the radicalization of Syrian society today does not have the kind of historical
precedent that is typical of such phenomenon. In other countries where Islamic
fundamentalism is rampant (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan) extremist elements had long
since been entrenched within their societies/cultures, thus making Syria somewhat of an
anomaly in this sense. The sudden and drastic wave of fundamentalism that has
accompanied the uprising in Syria is telling of the amount of frustration that existed
within the country under the economically unimpressive rule of Bashar-al-Assad.

II. Salafism: A Brief introduction
In order to do assess the causes of the oppositions receptiveness to hardcore
Salafism (such as that advocated by JN and ISIS), a definition of the term ‘Salafi’ is
required. It is also important at this point to make the distinction between ‘Salafi’, Salafi
Jihadi, and Islamist. Considering the irresponsibility/inaccuracy with which these terms
are thrown around in the Western media, it is essential to be able to distinguish between
them and the respective ideologies they subscribe to. While members of the FSA may
invoke jihad as a motivator in their fight against the regime, this does not make them
Salafi, or Salfi-Jihadi for that matter. While both Salafi-Jihadis and Islamists are
committed to the establishment of an Islamic state and the revival of political Islam, they
are not the same in that they subscribe to totally different methodologies in the
achievement and actual practice of an Islamic state.

6

Loschky, Jay. "5 Faith Facts on Religion in Syria - OnFaith." OnFaith. N.p., 25 Sept. 2013. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
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The name ‘Salafi’ originates from the word ‘Salaf’, which means predecessors or
ancestors. What the term is meant to invoke is a harkening back to the earliest Muslims
who are considered the best examples of Islamic practice. The contemporary term
‘Salafi’ has its roots in a nineteenth century movement of Islamic modernist reform. It is
now used to refer to conservative Muslims who seek to apply literalist interpretations of
scripture based on the example set by the Prophet and his companions7.
The following is an excerpt from a study on Jihad in Syria done by Elizabeth
O’Bagy, and provides a brief but comprehensive description of Salafism; “Salafism is a
Sunni school of jurisprudence most closely associated with Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal that
emphasizes the salaf, the earliest Muslim community, as the strict model for
contemporary Islamic practice .Salafists treat any divergence from this original model as
heresy, resulting in an extreme enmity towards what they consider heretical Islamic Sects
including Shiism and especially Basharal-Assad’s Alawite sect. According to Salafism,
the Quran, the Hadith, and the consensus of approved Islamic scholarship provide
sufficient guidance upon which to establish governance and a social framework. They
insist on the literal truth of the Quran and abide by a very narrow and conservative
version of Sharia, or Islamic law. Salafists look upon the entire early Islamic political
experience as religiously mandated. Thus, they tend to reject democracy since it entails
putting Islam to the vote rather than mandating it, and they have historically rejected all
modern political systems and ideas. Accordingly, they reject the concept of statehood and
seek to establish an Islamic caliphate that would encompass the entire Umma, or Muslim
community. Salafi movements go much further in restricting political and personal life

7
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than the more modern Islamist groups; in particular, they are averse to equal rights for
women and minorities.”8
There is also a distinction between traditional Salafis, such as those described
above, and, and Salafi Jihadis, with the former advocating political activism as the
primary means of enacting social change and the latter being a small subset of the former
who embrace an Islamist ideology that is heavily committed to the ‘rationalization of the
existence and behavior of militants’9. The term Salafi-Jihadi was coined by French
scholar Giles Kepel to describe the beliefs of Salafis who became interested in violent
JihadFrench scholar Giles Kepel coined the term Salafi-Jihadi to describe the beliefs of
Salafis who became interested in violent Jihad. Salafi Jihadis typically reject democracy
on the basis of it being a human encroachment on God given law, and consider the
violent targeting of democratic Muslim governments as legitimate for this reason.
Muslims of divergent schools of thought are also considered ‘apostates’ by hardcore
Salafi Jihadis, and are thus also legitimate targets in the enacting of Jihad.
There are essentially three types of Salafist groups operating in Syria ;(1) the
moderates, who are represented by the ‘Believers Participation Movement’ led by Sheikh
Louay-al-Zabi, (2) the traditional Salafis represented by the ‘Syrian Islamic Front (SIF)
which is a coalition of armed Salafist groups who lean towards the philosophy of
Mohammedal-Sarror, (3) the radical jihadists represented by the JN and led by Abu
Mohammed al-Golani. Moderate Salafists generally belong to a school of thought which
does not advocate revolutionary and violent jihad in their native countries after the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan. They are also typically supportive of political democracy.
8

Bagy, Elizabeth O' "Jihad In Syria." Middle East Security Report 6 (2012): 16-17. Understanding War. Web.
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf>.
9
Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge,2002), pp. 219-220
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In this sense they are more similar to the Muslim Brotherhood than to either the SIF or
the JN. The moderate Salafists belong to a school of thought that seeks the downfall of
the Assad regime and the establishment of a government based on Islamic principles. The
fighters of the SIF are considered moderate in the sense that their philosophy is more
tempered than that of their radical jihadi cousins in the ISIL and the JN. These radical
jihadis tend to espouse the revolutionary spirit of Egyptian scholars Sayed Qutb and
Ayman-al_zawahiri and strongly advocate the use of violence to bring Sharia law to
Islamic countries to bring about their eventual goal of recreating an Islamic Caliphate. 10

III. Why Salafism Was Able to Take Root in Syria
The reasons as to why Salafism was able to gain momentum in Syria are primarily
(but not solely) related to the socio-economic conditions affecting the Sunni majority in
the country. After the accession of Bashar al-Assad to power in
Syria, in the summer of 2000, some political and economic reforms were enacted. Of
these reforms, the most significant were those pertaining to the regimes relaxation of
control over the media and embrace of modern communications technology. This allowed
for gulf-funded TV stations and the internet to become the primary purveyors of Salafist
propaganda, while the significant Syrian labor migration to Saudi Arabia helped
consolidate the migrant class’s ties to Salafism11. In addition to these economic reforms,
the Assad regime began to grant non-political Islamist groups the space to organize social
and humanitarian activities. This was in stark contrast to Syria’s historical repression of
non-state sponsored Islamist activity. While these reforms were presented as a
10

Rawi, Waleed Al, and Sterling Jensen. "Syria's Salafist Networks: More Local than You Think." Web.
"Syria’s Salafi Insurgents; the Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front." UI Occasional Papers #17 (2013): n. pag. Swedish Institue of
International Affairs, Mar. 2013. Web.
11
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liberalizing measure, in reality it was a concession that the regime had no choice to make
in lieu of its failure to uplift the economy. This concession allowed for foreign-backed
Salafi movements to enter the religious framework of Syria.12
In the 1990s and 2000s, the bankruptcy of Baathist ideology, the globalization of
the world economy, and the redirection of regime patronage towards the urban economy
all combined to bring about a dramatic downturn in rural living standards. Rural religious
minorities were kept in line by their fear of Islamism, but the Sunni countryside became
increasingly exasperated with the Assad regime, and began to embrace oppositional and
Islamist politics.13 The Syrian uprising was, from the outset, rooted in the rural migrant
underclass. Years of economic decline and long lasting droughts ensured a prolonged
rural-urban migration, causing people to be uprooted from traditional, rural lifestyles and
thrown into rough, impersonal, and economically competitive environments that were a
far cry from the rural/agricultural social support networks they were accustomed to.14
Alongside with the State’s continuously declining ability to provide services there was
simultaneous erosion of faith in the ‘system’ (or the ‘nizam’ in Arabic) among socioeconomically disenfranchised communities. This erosion in faith in the ‘nizam’ (amongst
the rural migrant class) is in contrast to the economically liberal and socially conservative
merchant class that is based in the large cities, whose identity is ingrained in longestablished traditions and whose business activities demand religious pragmatism.15
Hardcore Salafi preachers looking to make ideological inroads into Syrian society found
little religious space to expand within city centers, as these city centers typically

12

Ibid
Ibid
14
"TENTATIVE JIHAD: SYRIA’S FUNDAMENTALIST OPPOSITION." Middle East Report N°131 (n.d.): n. pag. International
Crisis Group. Web.
15
Ibid
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comprised of a population that was well integrated with the economy and thus less
receptive (by virtue of comfort and security) to extreme views. The outskirts of the main
cities, on the other hand, comprised of a population that was economically
disenfranchised, socially insecure, and thus ideologically more receptive to the
conveniently simplistic and attractively aggressive rhetoric that is characteristic of
Salafism. Thus the suburbs of Damascus, Aleppo and Homs slowly became favorable
terrain for Salafi preachers.16

IV. Sectarian nature of conflict
Syria’s population is roughly 23 million, of which 74% are Sunni Muslims, 12%
are Alawite Shia’s, 4% are either Ismaili’s or Druze, 10% are made up of various
Christian denominations, and the rest are comprised of Kurds and small Jewish
communities. In 2010, 56% of the population lived in urban areas.17 The map shown on
the next page provides an insight into Syria’s ethno-religious divisions and is a useful
tool for understanding not only the larger conflict but also the increased influence of
Salafism on Sunni’s (an exclusively Sunni school of thought) in Syria.18

Map of Syrian Ethnic Divisions
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Crisis Group Report, The Syrian People’s Slow MotionRevolution
Syria Demographics Profile 2013." Syria Demographics Profile 2013. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Nov. 2013.
<http://www.indexmundi.com/syria/demographics_profile.html>.
18
Fisher, Max. "The One Map That Shows Why Syria Is so Complicated." Washington Post. N.p., 27 Aug. 2013. Web.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/08/27/the-one-map-that-shows-why-syria-is-so-complicated/>.
17
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The map below provides an illustration of approximate spheres of control as of
February 2014. In comparing this map to the previous one illustrating Syria’s ethnic
divisions it is both interesting and deeply worrying to note that the zones of control
largely line up with the ethnic divisions.
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While the socio-economic
economic condition prevalent in Syria prior to the onset of the
uprising is one reason why certain areas have become receptive to Salafist preaching, the
violent and unmistakably sectarian character of the Syrian civil war is another. Although
Bashar Al Assad was not biased against Sunni Syrians in their treatment prior to the
uprising, the same cannot be said for the time that has elapsed since demonstrations first
broke out. By garnering support from Sunni businesses and religious establishments,
marrying into Sunni families, and even occasionally appointing Sunnis to prominent and

20
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sensitive positions, Bashar-Al-Assad, prior to the uprising, had made deliberate efforts to
illustrate that his power set-up was not perceived to be aligned solely with the interests of
the Alawite minority.21
Yet the brutal response that Assad enacted against the demonstrations that broke
out in 2011 changed this perception (in whatever small pockets it existed), and confirmed
long-held suspicions held by the Sunni majority about the perceived ethno-centrism of
the Alawite minority. It is difficult to say with certainty whether or not the Assad
regime’s decision to use overwhelming force to quell the demonstrations was fueled by
sectarian motivations. What can be known for certain, however, is that this decision
(regardless of its intentions) changed the entire dynamic of the conflict for the worse; it
caused the Sunni majority to feel existentially threatened. This existential threat stemmed
from a belief that spread among Sunni’s following the harsh repression of Sunni majority
protests by Alawite units, that the conflict was being turned into a matter of Sunni vs.
Shia/Alawite rather than the regime vs. the people. It is this fear, more than anything else
that is likely to have driven young Syrian revolutionaries to embrace the influence of
Salafi-Jihadi preachers and recruiters. Fighters were thus drawn to Salafism because it
helped them embody a Sunni identity in the most radical and defiant way possible, while
also providing them with a theological explanation for the war against Shia Muslims22.
Salafism, not unlike other radical schools of thoughts, provides fighters with a spiritual

21
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security that enables them to break free of the fear of death since they can be certain of
their place in heaven; in their minds they are fighting on the direct command of God.23
While hardcore Salafism’s influence in Syria has definitely mushroomed since the
start of the war, it is not as if it has hijacked the revolution completely. Many in the
Syrian opposition are opposed to the idea of an Islamic State in a post-Assad future, a
fact that is bound to spark tensions/clashes between the ‘moderate’ FSA and the hardcore
Islamists like Nusra and ISIL. Syria's multi-ethnic, religiously diverse population and
tradition of secular Arab nationalism means that al-Nusra will probably not be able to
realize its dream of an Islamic empire. Nevertheless its dominant position within the rebel
groups makes it an important factor in the shaping of the Syrian religious-sectarian
character and the war in general.24

23

Ibid
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3. Jahbat-Al-Nusra: Core Beliefs, Origin, Structure & Strategy

Jahbat-Al-Nusra , also known as the Al-Nusra front, is a Salafi Jihadi group that emerged
in Syria in the early months of 2012. Its entrance on to the Syrian scene was marked by
its release of a video in 2012 that promised to wage jihad against Bashar-Al-Assad’s
regime. The implicitly sectarian and explicitly aggressive rhetoric initially led
mainstream opposition groups to discredit it as a regime sponsored maneuver to discredit
opposition fighters, yet the video won immediate online praise from Al-Qaeda
supporters.25 Over time, however, JN has emerged as arguably the most effective, best
equipped and most motivated fighting force amongst the Syrian opposition. While FSA
leaders have repeatedly warned of the dangers associated with emergence of Al-Qaeda
offshoots within the opposition (they are particularly critical of the disparity that exists in
funding for the FSA vs. funding that is available to the JN and ISI), they are cognizant of
the undeniable military effectiveness of these groups; “In August a high-profile Liwa alTowhid commander commended the group’s contribution, and a spokesman for the
Revolutionary Council of Aleppo and Countryside – a prominent activist organization
linked to Liwa al-Towhid – explained that Jabhat al-Nusra’s fighters were welcomed as
“heroes” in the city.”26
JN’s growing reputation for being well financed, well supplied and functionally
organized has even prompted defections from the FSA to JN in recent times; "Fighters
feel proud to join al-Nusra because that means power and influence," stated Abu Ahmed,
a former teacher from Deir Hafer who now commands an FSA brigade in the countryside

25
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near Aleppo. "Al-Nusra fighters rarely withdraw for shortage of ammunition or fighters
and they leave their target only after liberating it," he added. "They compete to carry out
martyrdom [suicide] operations."27 FSA commanders told reporters from the Guardian in
May 2013 that entire units had gone over to Al-Nusra while others had lost a quarter or
more of their strength to JN.28
JN is one of the two prominent Al-Qaeda offshoots operating in Syria, with the
other being the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS). There are a number of factors
that distinguish JN from regular opposition groups, the first being JN’s unabashed selfportrayal as a Salafi-jihadi group that is committed to not only the toppling of the Assad
regime, but also the eventual replacement of this regime with an Islamic state that follows
Salafi principles. JN’s open embrace of sectarian rhetoric is another distinguishing factor;
the group describes itself as the Sunni community’s aggressive defender against the
‘Alawite enemy’ and its “Shiite agents”.29 The group, in its communiques, refers to
Shiites as ‘rawafidh’ (rejectionists) and Alawites as ‘Nusayri’s’.30 The usage of ‘Nusayri’
instead of Alawite is a deliberate ploy aimed at highlighting the Alawite Sect’s
divergence from orthodox Islam, and is one of many hardcore Salafi-jihadist tendencies
that characterize JN.
The main distinguishing factor (with regard to tactics) between the JN and other
Salafi-jihadi opposition groups is that it successfully stages the most ambitious and
daring attacks, and displays a proficiency in the usage of suicide bombs as well as more
conventional warfare tactics. JN regularly claims responsibility for suicide bombings/car
27

Mahmood, Mona, and Ian Black. "Free Syrian Army Rebels Defect to Islamist Group Jabhat Al-Nusra." The Guardian. N.p., 8 May
2013. Web. 25 Nov. 2013.
28
Ibid
29
Ibid
30
"TENTATIVE JIHAD: SYRIA’S FUNDAMENTALIST OPPOSITION." Middle East Report N°131 (n.d.): n. pag. International
Crisis Group. Web.

21
bombings in civilian neighborhood and in this regard (target selection and tactics) it
displays similarities to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).31 Yet While JN has demonstrated its
willingness to use suicide bombings, its target selection is usually tailored to avoid
negative publicity. In this regard, it displays marked divergences from the less popular
strategies typically associated with groups that are linked with Al-Qaeda, particularly
ISIS. JN even renounced the killing of innocent civilians and attempted to distance itself
from the violent tactics used by ISIS. In an interview on the 18th of July, 2013, a top
operative of JN, Abu Ahmed, laid the blame for the killing of civilians on the ISIS and
cited the aggressive attitude of the group as one of the reasons for the rift between the
two32. It is also pertinent to note that while JN swears allegiance to Ayman-Al- Zawahiri,
the leader of Al-Qaeda, its competing offshoot, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater
Syria (al-Sham) is under the command of Abu-Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of AQI. Thus
while the two groups may sometimes have tactical differences and disagree on strategy, it
is misleading to say that they do not share the same goals and work in tandem towards
their achievement.
According to a study carried out by the British Qulliam foundation33, many cadres
of the JN originate from the jihadist network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi, a
Jordanian by birth, was the founder of the jihadist group al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, that first
operated in Afghanistan and later became allied with Al-Qaeda in 2004 and was
subsequently responsible for many suicide attacks and acts of violence against US forces
and Shia’s in Iraq. Syrians who had been part of Zarqawi’s network in Herat,
Afghanistan, were sent in 2000 to Syria and Lebanon, ostensibly to expand the reaches of
31
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the network. These fighters were charged with the responsibility of establishing
‘guesthouses’/launching pads in Syria from which to channel jihadists into Iraq.34 Despite
the pressure Syrian intelligence mounted on these jihadis, the networks initially
established by Zarqawi’s delegates in Syria were never destroyed and continued to exist
under the radar in Syria. Thus, when the revolution began, leading members of the ISI
(Islamic State of Iraq) decided to send Syrian Jihadists and Iraqi veterans of guerilla
warfare into Syria, although whether they intended for JN to be a branch of AQI or an
independent organization based in the Levant is a matter of some debate.35

II. Core beliefs and objectives
In order to be able to understand the effectiveness and dangers of any fighting
force it is vital to understand what motivates them. To understand Jabhat-al-Nusra’s place
within the Syrian quagmire, it is necessary to take stock of their ideology and goals. It is
a given, at this point, that JN and other Salafi Jihadi organizations are committed to make
an attempt to take control of the Syrian uprising and actualize their vision of an Islamic
Caliphate. In the likely event that the Assad regime loses further its ability to govern, the
Al-Nusra Front will use its status to promote Al-Qaeda’s end goal of transforming Syria
into Al-Qaeda’s frontline base in the Middle-East, in close geographical proximity to
Israel, Europe and pro-western Arab states. 36
The conflict in Syria represented an opportunity to establish a religiously justified
system of government for JN, as JN believes that every regime, which does not enforce
sharia as law, is illegitimate. In their first video statement on 24 January 2012, JN claim
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to be ‘bringing the law of Allah back to His land’. This notion comes from an
interpretation of a religious prophecy of the future found in several hadith (collections of
sayings attributed to the prophet Muhammad P.B.U.H), for example: ‘the center of the
realm of Islam is in al-Sham *the Levant’ and ‘I see the angels of Allah spreading their
wings over al-Sham *the Levant’. A number of hadith put Syria and the Levant at the
center of Islam's prophecy, as the first JN video explains: ‘the camp of the Muslims on
Judgment Day would be in Damascus’. JN believe that the Syrian revolution provides a
golden opportunity for them to work towards the realization of this prophecy, and they
work in the hope that they may become the people mentioned in these hadiths.”37
One of the essential tenets of JN’s ideology has been its uncompromising (and
vocal) adherence to its opposition to western assistance for the rebels. One of the reasons
the group stood out amongst the Syrian opposition is because they appeared at a time
when the FSA was making attempts to attract Western assistance. JN’s warnings against
seeking Western help and its attacks against the Turkish government for being
insufficiently Islamist and a Western pawn struck a chord with many a rebel in Syria,
particularly because the FSA had become disillusioned with hollow and inconsistent
Western promises of assistance.
According to reports garnered by the Qulliam foundation, JN was established
during a number of meetings between October 2011 and January 2012, and its five main
objectives were charted out during these meetings. These objectives were aimed at (1) the
establishment of a group that coordinates the efforts of existing Salafi- Jihadis in Syria,
(2) the reinforcement of the Islamist nature of the conflict, (3) the expansion of the
groups military capability vis-à-vis weapons seizures and the creation of physical safe
37
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havens from where to recruit, train and operate, (4) the creation of an Islamist state in
Syria that follows Salafi principles, (5) the establishment of a greater ‘Caliphate’ in
Bilad-al-Sham (the Levant). 38
In stark contrast to the structurally disorganized and tactically incoherent nature
of the FSA, JN is a well-organized group of fighters with a smooth functioning command
structure and an experienced host of leaders. Whereas the FSA is comprised of a chaotic
mixture of ex-military servicemen, civilians, and would-be Jihadists, JN is selective in its
recruitment and its leadership is made up of a cadre of experienced Jihadists who are
practiced in their execution of insurgency operations. Molded from the invaluable
experience their commanders gained in Iraq fighting a relatively much stronger enemy
(US forces), JN’s fundamental doctrine of warfare is one aimed at exhausting the enemy
through a long, drawn-out war.39
JN’s strategy is also heavily influenced by their religious motivations; they view
the Syrian conflict as an Islamic issue supported by not only religious texts but also by
the prophecy they cite. The framing of the issue in this particular context is significant as
it is what provides their fighters with the dogged determination and fearlessness that they
are known for. Another significant influence on JN strategy that is observable is the
lessons their leadership has garnered from experience in Iraq. The avoidance of
operations that incite mass unpopularity with the population is one example of the kind of
lessons the leadership is acting upon. In an attempt to gain widespread popularity and
credibility amongst the Syrian population, JN has made it a point to predominantly target
military rather than civic targets. In stark contrast to AQI strategy that has been
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previously demonstrated in Iraq, the Nusra front’s usage of suicide bombers is careful,
selective and aimed at minimum loss of civilian life.40 In a similar vein JN has
downplayed its sectarian rhetoric since its inception, adjusting for the initial unpopularity
it bought them with both the international community and the rest of the opposition.

Al-Nusra’s Battle to Win Hearts and Minds
The Al-Nusra Front ascribes a great deal of importance to the battle for hearts and
minds. Its media network is used as a means of disseminating information on its
operations, views, and messages to broad target audiences in Syria and the Arab-Muslim
world. The battle for hearts and minds is also intended to aggrandize the organization’s
abilities in the fight to topple the Assad regime, strengthen its position among the rebel
groups, encourage fighters from Syria and the Arab-Muslim world to join its ranks, raise
funds, inculcate operatives with the ideological messages of radical Islam, and extend the
legitimacy the organization enjoys with the Syrian population.41
JN is unusual in that, out of the groups associated with Al-Qaeda, it is ostensibly
the most motivated in garnering and maintaining popular support, to the extent that it will
adjust not only its rhetoric but also its military tactics so as to minimize the damage to its
public image. This marked departure from past, known AQ strategies is likely to have
been influenced by the ‘Sahwat-al-Qaba’il’ (Sunni tribal resurgence) that AQI faced in
Iraq42. This particular aspect of JN’s behavior within the conflict has boosted its
reputation a significant amount. Another aspect of JN strategy is the amount of emphasis
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the leadership places on the maintenance of non-military work; missionary-style
preaching (Da’wa) and humanitarian work through their social wing ‘Qism al-Igatha’,
which distributes basic provisions to the needy and regulates grocery prices so as to
prevent war-time exploitation of those affected by the conflict.43 Such strategies seemed
to have evolved out of a strong desire to remain popular with the local population; many
of JN’s fighters are foreigners and the group leadership’s decision is likely impacted by
the alienation that was experienced by foreign Al-Qaeda fighters at the hands of local
Sunni’s in Iraq.
This battle for hearts and minds is intended to aggrandize the organization’s
abilities in the fight to topple the Assad regime, strengthen its position among the rebel
groups, encourage fighters from Syria and the Arab-Muslim world to join its ranks, raise
funds, inculcate operatives with the ideological messages of radical Islam, and extend the
legitimacy the organization enjoys with the Syrian population44.

Media and Propaganda
JN operate their own media network called ‘al-manara al badya’ (The White Minaret).
The significance of this name lies in the reference it makes to the white minaret of alSham which is mentioned in the hadith, beside which the Messiah is supposed to descend
at the end of the world according to Islamic prophecy. This network is used to make
documentary-style propaganda videos that often feature interviews with suicide bombers
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and car-bomb attacks, in true Al-Qaeda fashion. This network is also used to disseminate
information to the outside world through the most legitimate jihadi forum (in the eyes of
jihadis), called ‘Shumukh al-Islam’45. JN display a certain maturity of strategy in the way
they handle dissemination of information, be it with regard to the claiming of
responsibility for attacks, the timing of such claims, the deliberate ambiguity with regard
to future plans for Syria, the absence of direct statements regarding Sharia law and lastly,
the actual existence of a media team within JN. The rhetoric on the subject of long-term
goals is deliberately left very soft-worded and ambiguous, which is not to suggest that
these long-term goals are flexible in nature, but rather that JN leadership does not want to
draw unnecessary attention to the group, preferring a strategy of silence that embeds them
subtly as nothing more than another component of a larger, more powerful opposition.46
The general behavior of JN’s media wing is reminiscent of past Jihadi
organizations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; interviews of suicide bombers, videos of
attacks, and a preference towards disseminating information only through respected
jihadi forums. Yet two areas in which their media behavior differs from other Jihadi
groups is, (1) the amount of ambiguity that the JN leadership is willing to tolerate in the
public realm and (2) ,the fact that they do not prioritize the press as other Jihadi outfits do
and often do not claim responsibility for all of their attacks. There have been multiple
instances in which Al-Jazeera and Al- Arabiya news have credited attacks perpetrated in
actuality by JN to other opposition groups and JN has done nothing to challenge the
claim in the media. This strategy of silence is typically a collective behavior more closely
associated with intelligence agencies than with jihadi groups and is meant to create fear
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and notoriety via ambiguity and silence. The logic is that if you claim responsibility for
something you are displaying a need for validation and acknowledgment, whereas if you
deny something you are displaying a need for the particular act to be disassociated from
you, which in itself is a need for validation. The strategy of silence is effective as
ambiguity leaves people guessing; it makes an individual or a group’s behavior
unpredictable and therefore causes that individual or group (particularly when it is an
intelligence agency or jihadi organization) to be feared. This behavior lends credence to
the unsubstantiated reports that Lebanese intelligence officers are involved with the JN
leadership. On the other hand this behavior can be attributed to JN’s wish not to
antagonize other rebel groups by contesting claims on attacks, as this is a common source
of conflict between opposition groups in Syria.47
One area in which JN’s behavior differs from other opposition groups within
Syria is the timing of their messages and claiming of responsibilities for attacks. While
other groups provide real-time updates, JN provides delayed reports of its operations that
cover multiple attacks in a particular time period. It is only when particularly fruitful
attacks are completed that the JN media reports focus on any one particular attack.48
Although this aspect of their media behavior often allows for less powerful public impact,
it is telling of the professionalism of its leadership; real time updates have negative
ramifications for security as they can point to locations of operatives as well as give away
strategy in the short term.
JN also maintains its own online message board website, under the domain name
‘www.jalnosra.com’ which was created in January 2013. The website, which is still
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active, contains videos and announcements released by the organization and has some
amount of informational collaboration with the White Minaret. JN had previously
maintained a Facebook page, which in January 2013 had 10,000 likes. 49 Although their
Facebook presence has been retracted, the group still maintains a Twitter account which
can be accessed at twitter.com/JbhatALnusra. Although the account has not tweeted since
April 2013, at the time the website was accessed for the purposes of this paper, the
account had 79,235 followers.50 JN’s announcements, be it on their website, twitter
account or on the White Minaret, have tended to downplay sectarian rhetoric and
generally steer clear of ideological messages that may dampen their support among the
local populace. The organization does not typically engage in ideological debates with
other groups, although there have been exceptions to this rule; when JN condemned the
actions of the ISIS in July 2013, citing their aggressive nature and their targeting of
civilians as a reason for the rift between the two, and when the group, in an attempt to
deal with criticism, released videos and statements denying its responsibility for a suicide
bombing attack that took place in a Damascus neighborhood in October 2012 in which
women and children were killed. 51

Recruitment Strategy
JN, in trying to maintain the quality and effectiveness of its fighting capability, is
selective in its recruitment of fighters. This selectivity is manifested in the ‘tezkiyya’
(personal assurance) that is required from two commanders on the front line that verifies
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a recruit’s skill, religious commitment and overall ability to join the group.52 JN often
embeds recruiters in the front lines of FSA units to vet for potential recruits, and these
recruits are subsequently tested for bravery, dedication and loyalty to the JN ideology.53
These recruits must take a religious oath swearing to Allah their absolute allegiance to
their jihadist leaders, which has the effect of creating a functional command structure;
recruits have no legal recourse should they wish to either leave or disobey an order. This
kind of oath is designed to mimic the function of ‘Army acts’ in regular armies, which
are legal clauses that make desertion and insubordination punishable by law in regular
militaries. Another reason that Nusra is able to not only maintain a sizable force of
effective fighters, but also to induce large defections from the FSA to itself is because of
the higher pay it offers to its fighters. 54

Leadership
The leader of Jabhat-al-Nusra is allegedly a man named Abu Mohammad alJulani. Very little is known about Julani to the point where there still exists a significant
amount of doubt about his identity. According to investigations by the British Qulliam
think tank, Julani has family ties to the area of the Golan Heights and was formerly a
staunch supporter of Abu-Musab Al Zarqawi of AQI fame in Iraq. 55 The investigation
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also revealed that Al Julani’s identity is closely guarded by the organization, to the point
where his face is usually covered in meetings and his voice always distorted in audio
releases. Al Julani carries the title of ‘amir’ which is a title used typically to denote the
heads of Islamic organizations around the world. Abu Muhammad al-Julani is also
referred to as al-mas’oul (the person in charge), al-mas’oul al-‘aam (the chief person in
charge), and al-sheikh al-fateh (the conquering sheikh). 56
Julani has displayed a mature understanding of Syrian society and politics,
carefully and skillfully weaving his organization into its fabric. While JN’s competitor
ISIL has created enemies everywhere through its attempts at domination by force and
force alone, Al Nusra has won friends and/or grudging acceptance, opening itself to
dialogue, compromise and cooperation with other factions, and, ostensibly at least,
respecting local cultural sensitivities more.
In an audio track released on Jabuary 24, 2012, Al-Julani said that the overthrow
of the Assad regime was only half the struggle considering that his organizations goal
was to replace the regime with an Islamic State governed by Sharia law. He warned
against the ills of accepting Western assistance and in December 2012 proclaimed the AlNusra Front as the main fighting force against the regime.57 Al-Julani’s mindset and
worldview are likely very similar to those held by Al-Qaeda; this can be extrapolated
from Al-Julani’s association with Zarqawi and his public vow of allegiance to Ayman-alZawahiri.
Al-Julani made a rare and unexpected appearance on Al-Jazeera on December
10th, 2013. Though his back was to the camera and his face remained covered, Julani
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spoke at length about the goals, vision and position of JN within Syria. The interview,
targeting viewers throughout Syria and the Arab-Muslim world, was aimed at
establishing the Nusra Front as a legitimate factor within the Syrian population without
having to abandon its long-term objectives. Julani played down the connection with AlQaeda, calling the affiliation merely ‘ideological’, warned against Hezbollah entering the
war, and pledged commitment to the establishment of a state governed by Sharia law.
58

With regard to post-Assad plans Julani treaded carefully, stating that ‘al-Nusra

wants consultations with Muslim scholars and thinkers who supported the Syrian
uprising, to draft a plan for running the country according to Sharia.’59 Joulani also stated
that he had no intentions of monopolizing power and was open to the idea of an alliance
with secular rebels. 60 This offer, rather than being interpreted as a sign of weakness,
should be seen as further evidence of the mature pragmatism that governs the decision
making of JN’s leader. Much of JN’s success can be attributed to Julani’s cautious,
pragmatic and forward thinking strategies.
It is interesting to note that the interviewer, Al-Jazeera’s Tayseer Allouni had
previously interviewed Bin Laden and said that the security measures taken prior to the
interview by Al-Joulani’s team far exceeded those of Bin Laden’s, a fact that is testament
to the extreme precautions JN undertakes in keeping the identity of its leader a secret. 61

Structure

58

“Al-Qaeda Leader in Syria Speaks to Al Jazeera” Middle East. Al Jazeera, 19 December. 2013
Ibid
Habib, Maria Abi. “Syrian Al-Qaeda Says It is Open to Alliance With More Secular Rebels.” The Wall Street Journal, 19
December. 2013
59
60

61

“Ultimatum from Syrian Al-Qaeda Group.” Al Jazeera America. Al Jazeera International, 25 February. 2014

33
The structure of JN is similar to that of other Jihadi organizations with an ‘amir’,
Abu Mohammad al-julani, at the helm of the organization, and a number of local
commanders, also known as ‘amirs’, presiding under the ‘al-mas’oul al-‘aam’. These
local commanders are responsible for the command and governance of Syria’s various
governorates in which JN are active. JN publications allude to the existence of a ‘Majlis
Shura al-Mujahideen’ (Council of Jihadis), which functions as a governing body and to
which JN’s various military and governmental bodies are subservient and answerable
to.62
With regard to military structure, the JN military units are divided into brigades,
battalions and companies. Although the naming of these units suggests a strict and
regimented compartmentalization of fighters within the organization, jihadi groups tend
to be fluid and flexible in their military structure, particularly in the wake of the need for
constant adaptation in the context of asymmetrical guerilla warfare. According to reports
garnered by the Meir Emit Intelligence Information Center, some of JN’s companies are
made up of single nationalities; Tunisian companies, Chechen companies, Jordanian
companies etc. 63 The logic behind the creation of such units is two folded; it allows for
the individual companies to function more efficiently (absence of language barriers and
better unit morale) and it also allows for these companies to evolve into core jihadist
networks that can expand the Salafi jihadist network in the long run, once they return to
their home countries after having gained guerilla warfare experience in Syria.64
The military structure of JN is flexible in that it varies across Syria’s various
regions and according to the state of the conflict in those regions. In the outskirts of
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Aleppo, for example, the units are organized on conventional military lines; companies,
battalions, brigades, and platoons that operate in tandem as a fighting force. In Damascus,
however, where most of the fighting is done on the streets, urban guerilla tactics are
followed and the structure of the units is tailored so as to maximize the effectiveness of
these tactics; instead of companies, units are split into cells to lessen chances of detection.
65

There are conflicting reports as to what the actual number of active JN militants in
Syria is; according to reports garnered from the FSA by David Ignatius for the
Washington Post in November 2012, JN fighter strength ranged from anywhere in
between 6000 to 10’000 fighters. 66 The British Qulliam Foundation’s assessment of JN
fighter strength in late 2012 was 5000 operatives.67 The Meir Emit Intelligence and
Information Center, which published its study in September 2013, estimates that these
numbers have grown by at least a couple of thousand fighters since late November
201268. This estimate is consistent with the recent reports of FSA desertions to JN. Given
the recent fame, or infamy (depending on the perspective) that JN has gained within the
Syrian conflict it is entirely possible that current strength of their numbers has exceeded
10’000.
Foreign Fighters
The number of foreign fighters joining the ranks of the Syrian opposition is a
major concern as these fighters will later return to their home countries and spread
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jihadist networks using the links they establish. The total number of foreign fighters in
Syria is estimated at 8,000. Of these 8,000, 2,000 are from Western countries, 600-700
are from non-Arab Muslim countries, and the rest are from Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Palestine etc. 69. These foreign fighters are drawn to groups like JN because of
their eminence amongst the opposition.
That such a large number of foreign fighters have joined the ranks of the
opposition in such a short time period is testament to the emotional pull that the Sunni
cause in Syria invokes in Sunni’s around the world. It took nearly a decade for similar
amounts of foreign fighters to amass in Pakistan’s tribal regions and Afghanistan, a fact
that is telling of the attractiveness of the Syrian Jihad. Most, but not all of these foreign
fighters share a Salafi-Jihadist ideology while some are simply motivated by a sense of
empathy with the Syrian people, a desire to be part of the overthrow of Assad or merely a
desire for adventure.70 These individuals tend to be particularly susceptible to ideological
indoctrination; Western European Muslims often harbor the greatest feelings of
frustration against their home countries, making them ideal candidates for suicide
bombing missions. The use of foreign suicide bombers by JN is widespread; some 53
suicide bombers participated in suicide missions in Syria in 2013. Of these, 23 were
foreigners. 71 One such example is the suicide attack carried out on a prison in Aleppo by
a British national of Pakistani descent on behalf of al-Nusra, on February 6th, 2014.72
Understanding JN’s Relationships with Other Players
Islamic State of Iraq-Levant
69

Foreign Fighters in Syria” The Meir Emit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2013): Web.

70

Ibid
"Jahbat-Al-Nusra." The Meir Emit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2013): Web.

71

72

“Foreign Fighters in Syria” The Meir Emit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2013): Web.

36
Though JN originates from AQI and relied on them initially for both financing
and direction, once JN began gaining popularity its leader, Julani, who had previously
taken orders directly from ISIL leader Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi, began to distance JN from
ISIL. In April 2013 Baghdadi released a statement announcing the grand unification of
organizations in Iraq and Syria into the ISIL. 73This statement was immediately countered
by Julani who swore allegiance to Zawahiri in a deliberately defiant move aimed at
unequivocally establishing that JN was Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria and hence not
subservient to Baghdadi’s organization. The establishment of this link beyond any shred
of doubt was cemented by a statement from Zawahiri in June 2013 which announced
officially the disunion between JN and AQI/ISIL. 74 This statement had the effect of
aggravating tensions between the two groups and lowered the morale of many of the
foreign volunteers within JN ranks (some of whom deserted) who took issue with JN
refusing to take orders from the ‘amir’ in Iraq75. The split began manifesting itself in the
establishment of separate media outlets, independent (disunited) conduction of
operations, and more recently, direct clashes between the two groups. JN leadership cited
the brutal tactics towards civilians as one of the reasons behind the split. The statement is
in keeping with JN’s overarching goal of winning hearts and minds and establishing long
term roots in Syria.
The fundamental ideological contention point between the Al-Nusra Front and the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is that of long-term vision; ISIL is committed to
establish an Islamic Caliphate that fundamentally rejects the Sykes-Picot border
agreements, and is committed to establishing this while it fights the regime. JN, on the
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other hand, has presented itself narrowly as a branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria and has always
espoused the toppling of the regime as the primary objective, only after which the
establishment of an Islamic state could be pursued.
Since April 2013 conflict between JN and ISIL in Northern and Eastern Syria
have led to significant bloodshed and have had the overall effect of weakening the
insurgency as a whole. Total deaths caused by the clashes between Nusra, other groups
and ISIL number close to 2’000. 76 The tactics, brutal punishments, and harsh governance
methods used by ISIL have made them highly unpopular with the Syrian population and
have caused other rebel groups, including JN, to publically distance/disassociate
themselves from ISIL. The Al-Qaeda high command too has long since been exasperated
by the conduct of ISIL and officially disassociated itself from ISIL on the 3rd of February
2014 through an official statement that carried the weight of Zawahiri’s personal opinion
on the matter. 77 The implications of the feud between ISIL and JN are having interesting
effects on the kinds of people whom are willing to work with either of them. In the
aftermath of the split ISIL is picking up all the exclusionary hardliners, while Nusra is
left with the people arguing for pragmatism and winning hearts and minds and striking
roots for the long run.78
Other Salafi Jihadi Groups
JN’s split with ISIL, however wise in the context of maintaining local popularity,
caused the organization some significant setbacks; a number of foreign JN volunteers
either went back home or joined ISIL, JN no longer received funds from ISIL and neither

76

77

“Ultimatum from Syrian Al-Qaeda Group.” Al Jazeera America. Al Jazeera International, 25 February. 2014

Lund, Aron. “A Public Service Announcement from Al-Qaeda.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 3 February. 2014
78
Ibid

38
did it enjoy the tactical benefits of collaborating with another large, well trained and
effective rebel group. As a consequence of all this, JN sought to increase its operational
cooperation with other likeminded Jihadi groups.
It is pertinent to note that up until September 2013 JN was not formally a part of
the coalition fighting against the Assad regime, the reason being that the group leadership
wished to avoid entrenching itself in institutionalized alliances with rebel groups of
differing composition and ideology. 79 JN leadership instead preferred to cooperate within
Islamic military frameworks that do not necessarily espouse Al-Qaeda ideology. In
September 2013, however, a total of eleven rebel brigades including JN formally entered
into an Islamic alliance on the basis that they were all fighting for a common cause; the
establishment of an Islamic State under Sharia law. To what extent JN orchestrated the
formation of this coalition, and whether it was done in an effort to recuperate from the
split with ISIL is difficult to ascertain. The inclusion of JN in a formal Islamic coalition
that includes brigades from the FSA and other ‘moderate’ cadres is a symbolic victory for
Al-Qaeda. Their inclusion grants the Nusra Front more legitimacy and is reflective of the
acceptance that the group enjoys within the opposition. The graph below represents the
groups that were a signatory to this alliance and also plots the preexisting alliances of
these groups.80
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Three groups; Ahrar
Ahrar-Al-Sham (Islamic Movement of the Free Men of Syria),
Syria the
Al-Farouq
Farouq battalions, and Liwa
Liwa-al-Tawhid
Tawhid (Brigade of the Unity of God) are JN’s
preferred partners in conducting joint operations. Of these groups, none are directly
affiliated with Al-Qaeda
Qaeda and all have fighter strengths nea
nearing
ring or exceeding 10’000
men81. Military cooperation between these groups has been effective, particularly in the
fight for control for border crossings in Northern Syria along the Turkey
Turkey--Syria border.
Free Syrian Army
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The relationship between JN and the FSA is one of ad-hoc cooperation; the
groups cooperate in the pursuance of the same primary objective, which is the toppling of
the Assad regime, but disagree over long term visions for Syria. The Syrian National
Council (SNC) has stated publically that it intends to pursue the establishment of a
democratic regime pandered to the interests of Syrians, while JN (along with its affiliates)
seek to establish an Islamic state based on their literalist/radical interpretation of Islamic
jurisprudence. While this ad-hoc cooperation will likely continue so long as the Assad
regime remains intact, it is difficult to imagine any scenario in a post Assad future in
which the larger and more politically ingrained FSA and SNC ever embraces JN as a
legitimate political entity and partner. The FSA are only too cognizant of the fact that the
main reason that weapon supplies from the West have been primitive and slow to arrive
is because of the fear of the proliferation of these weapons into the wrong hands, such as
those of JN. 82 Absent the existence of Al-Qaeda affiliates, the prospect of arming the
Syrian rebels with advanced weaponry, such as MANPAD’s, would be considerably less
risky for Western countries-a fact that the FSA hold against groups like JN despite their
undeniable military effectiveness against the regime. JN and the FSA are decidedly wary
of one another, as they are vying for popularity amongst the Syrian population. Both
sides acknowledge that it will be hard for the groups to work together after the fall of the
regime, as they are essentially rivals in the long term.
JN’s decision to distance/disassociate itself from ISIS, augmented by Zawahiri’s
public disassociation from ISIS, has benefitted JN in the way FSA commanders began
publically admitting to working with JN. Jamaal Maarouf, head of the Western backed
Syrian Revolutionary Front not only admitted to fighting alongside JN in an interview
82
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with The Independent but also stated that while he would continue to commit to fighting
ISIS, he would fight against JN because they (Al-Qaeda) ‘are not our problem’. 83
JN’s position within the Syrian rebels is not as insecure by way of their
association with Al-Qaeda as many Western analysts would like to believe. Contrary to
the widespread assumption that the FSA resents JN and its affiliates for the Jihadi stigma
(and hence Western hesitancy to support the rebels) that they bring, FSA commanders
have gone as far as to call the Nusra Front ‘brothers’. In a YouTube video uploaded in
March 2013, founder and (one of the) top commanders of the FSA, Colonel Riyad-al
Assad referred to members of JN as ‘Sunni brothers’ whom the FSA had provided direct
support to on a number of occasions. 84 When the US designated JN as a terrorist
organization in late 2012, none other than the head of the Syrian Opposition Council
himself (Moaz al Khatab) urged the US to reconsider its designation citing the
widespread admiration that JN evoked amongst the rebels as one of the reasons. 85

Funding & Foreign support
A large portion of the initial funding/financing of the Al-Nusra Front was
provided directly by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the same group from which it originated
from. Evidence for this can be found in a statement of Abu-Muhammad al Julani (leader
of JN) in which he thanks the leader of AQI for their financial assistance. 86 Since its
inception, however, JN has established its own methods of financing, reaching out to
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networks of clerics, charitable organizations and wealthy individuals sympathetic to their
cause and impressed by their military effectiveness. It was reported in a Rueters article on
June 22, 2013 that according to U.S and European intelligence officials, JN was being
funded by wealthy (unnamed) families in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 87
Since the start of the Syrian civil war, many pro rebel Islamic conferences have
been held in the Middle East to collect money for fighters in Syria. How much of this
money finds its way to JN is unverifiable, yet it can be safely assumed that the Syrian
opposition’s Special Forces equivalent is likely receiving a significant portion of these
funds as well. Much of JN’s funding had been taken care of by ISIS, thus when the
ideological rift occurred in early 2013, it had the effect of ‘orphaning’ JN. This financial
slashing may have been part of the reason Nusra engaged in an effort to unify Islamist
groups such as Ahrar-al Sham, Al-Tawhid and Liwaa al Islam with itself in an
agreement.88

Turkish assistance to Salafi Jihadi groups is more tacit than it has been overt, but
it cannot be denied that actions taken by the Turkish government have benefitted groups
like the Nusra Front. While no substantiated evidence of Turkish financial assistance to
JN can be found, there are many that allege that Tayyip Erdogan’s hardcore Islamist
supporters provide reason enough for Turkey to turn a blind eye to the weapons and other
materials flowing from Turkey into the hands of Salafi Jihadist groups such as JN89. In an
article published in the New York Times in March 2013, it was reported that far from
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turning a blind eye, Arab governments and Turkey have expanded their military aid to
Syria’s opposition through a series of airlifts overseen by the C.I.A. The Turkish
government was given the biggest role to play in this military logistics operation, but the
Qatari, Jordanian and Saudi Air Forces were all involved in transporting a large amount
of infantry weapons bought by Saudi Arabia from a Croatian controlled stockpile in
Zagreb to Esenboga airport in Ankara.90 The New York Times investigation revealed that
eighty-five military planes flew from Qatar to Turkey between January 2012 and March
2013, delivering a cumulative payload of 3500 tons of weapons.91The C.I.A, playing a
‘consultative’ role, allegedly setup clandestine offices to shop for weapons and vet on
ground commanders to determine whom to distribute to upon arrival. 92. The fact that the
C.I.A has aided and abetted the armament of the opposition is curious considering the
U.S designates JN, widely regarded as the spearhead of the opposition, as a terrorist
organization and has even placed a bounty on the head of its leader.
U.S officials have attempted to validate this ostensibly incoherent policy with the
logic that since other countries were going to arm the rebels anyway, it was in the U.S’s
interests to oversee the armament so that they could make sure that it was the moderates,
and not the jihadists, that were being armed93. This logic/narrative does not stand up to
on-ground realities since regardless of whom the weapons were initially provided to it
can be assumed that JN’s popularity, influence and proficiency in acquiring weapons
would allow for them to attain at least some portion of these arms. The statements of a
commander of Ahrar-al-Sham interviewed by the New York Times in March 2013
90
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indicated that some of these weapons were being acquired by fake revolutionary groups
that were then selling them in the open market.94 If this is true then it is safe to assume
that the C.I.A has played a part in indirectly arming an organization that is inextricable
from Al-Qaeda. Evidence for the proliferation of these Saudi purchased Croatian
weapons into the hands of JN can be found in a YouTube video posted by Al-Jazeera
Arabic on March 27, 2013, which clearly shows an M79 Osa, a90 mm portable anti-tank
weapon, in the hands of a Nusra Front operative fighting to capture a military base
outside of Al Sahweh, Daraa in mid- February, 2013.95 The fact that the U.S and other
European countries are hesitant to provide higher quality weapons to the rebels is telling
of the widespread fear of proliferation of weapons to jihadist outfits.

Turkey’s stance towards involvement in Syria took a notable turn when in June
2012 a Turkish F-4 was shot down on the Turkey-Syria border. Northern Syria in June
2012 was still largely dominated by the Syrian military, but when the Turkish
government responded to the shooting with an announcement that it would fire on
Syrians units that so much as approached the border, the Syrian Army relaxed their
presence in parts of the North, creating a de-facto buffer zone. This change in Turkey’s
rules of engagement benefitted groups like JN who used this buffer zone to hunker down
in the Northern parts of Syria.96 Turkey also provides safe border passage for opposition
fighters seeking haven in Turkey, where it has been alleged that there are training camps
and safe houses frequented by Salafi Jihadists. Groups like ISIL, Ahrar-al Sham and
Jabhat-al Nusra are all heavily dependent on the usage of Turkish border crossings for
94
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supplies, recruits and the ability to reach safety. The telegraph reported in May 2012 that
according to its sources Turkish Intelligence was going as far as training Syrian rebels in
Istanbul. 97 Evidence for the fact that Turkish-Syrian border crossings are logistical
priorities for JN and affiliated groups can be found in the fact that some of the heaviest
intra-rebel fighting took place over control over these crossings98. Circumstantial
evidence for Turkey’s outright support for Jabhat-al-Nusra and its affiliates can be
garnered from the fact that it downed a Syrian Mi-17 on March 23rd, 2014 on the grounds
of airspace violation. The Syrian plane in question had been charged with performing
airstrikes on rebels who had been waging a three day long pitched battle in an (eventually
successful) effort to gain control of the Kasab border crossing, which was at the time, the
last border crossing in the North not to be held by the rebels. Damascus has accused
Turkey of providing tank and artillery cover fire for the rebels operating in the same area
in the aftermath of the downing of the Syrian jet. 99 If these allegations are true, a
decisive and aggressive change in Turkish policy towards Syria has occurred, and it can
be assumed that Istanbul will continue, if not upgrade, its level of support towards the
opposition and by extension, the Al-Nusra Front.
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Assessing the Military/Governance Capability of JN
The scope of JN’s operations is extensive in both a geographical and a qualitative
sense. In rural areas where the writ of the government ranges from weak to completely
non-existent JN engages in larger, more ambitious conventional military operations
aimed at seizing military bases, infrastructure sites, and airfields. In and around the cities
Nusra engages in small-scale guerilla warfare, utilizing suicide bombers and IED’s.
Whereas all other rebel groups have selective regions in which they tend to direct most of
their activity, JN’s operations and fighters are active in all thirteen of Syria’s
governorates. The map below illustrates where various rebel groups are most active and
is useful in comprehending the comparatively superior geographical dispersion of JN
operations.
What makes JN more dangerous than other groups is the consistency with which
it manages to continue attacking the regime. The group carries out 3-4 assassinations
weekly, targeting officers of the regime, media personalities, politicians and businessmen
alike.100 In November 2012 Nusra claimed responsibility in one day alone for 45 attacks
in Damascus, Daraa, Hama and Homs provinces that reportedly killed dozens, including
60 in a single suicide bombing.101
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Map of Syrian Rebel Strongholds102

The style, tactics, goals and intended effect of JN’s military operations vary
according to region and requirement. Overall, JN displays a great deal of flexibility in the
kind of warfare it can engage in, from large scale offensives designed to capture military
bases to small scale suicide bombings intended to symbolically weaken the perceived
strength of the regime.
102
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JN essentially operate an urban-rural warfare strategy; they take control of the
countryside around cities and then launch low-level urban guerrilla attacks inside those
cities. These urban attacks, often assisted by suicide bombers, are based on political
terrorization; the aim is to create insecurity, fear and mistrust of the government’s ability
to endure the insurgency. 103 Asymmetric warfare is used by JN to great effect in
exposing and exacerbating the regime’s weaknesses by launching attacks/suicide
bombings on symbolic military/intelligence institutions. JN is particularly unapologetic in
its use of suicide bombers, and is responsible for an overwhelming majority of the suicide
bombings (57 out of 72 in July 2013) perpetrated in Syria since the outbreak of the civil
war. The tactical advantage JN gains from heavy reliance on suicide bombers is that it
encounters minimal losses while delivering significant loss of life/damage to property to
the regime.
JN has, since its inception, become widely regarded as the principal force against
Assad because of its military successes. Nusra’s first six months in action were
characterized by mass-casualty bombings, such as the double suicide bombing in
Damascus on the 10th of May 2012 that killed 55 and injured hundreds. The map below,
compiled by the Institute For the Study of War, plots these major JN attacks for 2012.

103 103

Benotman, Nathan, and Rosin Blake. "Jahbat-Al-Nusra : A Strategic Briefing." Qulliam Foundation (n.d.): n. pag.
Qulliamfoundation.org. Qulliam Foundation, May 2013. Web.

49

Map of JN Attack Trends 2012104

Since then (2012), however, the group has incorporated conventional guerrilla
operations, the usage of IED’s and small arms attacks into its repertoire with great effect.
Some of the various types of operation in which JN are engaged include: car bombs;
suicide attacks; destroying checkpoints, arson attacks on liquor shops, the execution of
media professionals; and assassinations, including that of the Interior Minister and that of
104
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the entire Khaliyat al-Azma (the Crisis Taskforce).105 This Taskforce was designed to
handle the regime's response to the rebels and included some of Bashar al-Assad's
relatives and the Minister for Defense.
JN’s modus operandi is markedly different from other rebel groups. An example
is their targeting of media facilities and personalities; in June 2012 Nusra attacked a progovernment TV station and the next month they executed a government TV presenter.
While assassinations are considered standard behavior for Jihadist groups, rarely do they
target the media. This departure from standard behavior is telling of the way that Nusra
leadership aims to expand its influence to the maximum in Syria through intimidation of
the media. Media intimidation has been used to great effect by the Pakistani Taliban, to
the point where even the most prominent newspapers in the country are hard pressed to
condemn/criticize the Jihadists. This grants jihadists ideological space, which is the
lifeblood of any guerilla strategy, a fact that Nusra leadership appears to understand well.
One area in which JN has not displayed its usual proficiency is in ability to bring
down government airplanes and helicopters. Although rebels have shot down many MIGs
and other helicopters, JN forces have claimed only one such attack. This would seem to
demonstrate a lack of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADs), consistent with the
international effort to keep these weapons out of jihadist hands. 106
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While Nusra’s arrival on to the Syrian scene was marked by a string of extremely
damaging suicide bombings, it has since developed a conventional warfare capability that
has borne successful results in the seizure of various Syrian military bases, checkpoints
and infrastructure sites. Since October 2012, rebels have taken control of five major
military installations. 107
On December 10th, 2012 rebel forces, spearheaded by JN, took control of the
Sheikh Suleiman base, a key Syrian research facility linked to the production of chemical
weapons. Two months earlier, JN, in a joint operation, assaulted and seized a Syrian air
defense base in Aleppo. In mid-January 2013 JN and Ahrar-al-Sham launched a joint
operation to take control of Taftanaz, a key Syrian air force base in Idlib, from where
large weapons caches as well as tanks, armored vehicles and helicopters were seized by
the rebels. A month later rebel forces mounted an attack on Al-Jarrah airfield, making it
the fourth large military base to fall into their hands108. During the same month
(February, 2013) Al-Nusra fighters, working with other rebel forces, took over an army
encampment in Tabqa along the Euphrates River, securing large amounts of artillery and
ammunition and giving them control of a key checkpoint in the town. In early August
2013 rebels managed to gain control of the large Minakh airbase in northern Syria,
seizing additional weapons and tanks. The seizure was significant as it came during a
time where an influx of foreign fighters from Lebanon and an extended air campaign had
caused the rebels huge losses, particularly around Homs and Damascus. The seizure of
Al-jarrah was particularly significant as it contained Syrian fighter jets. Given the
extreme air superiority of the regime, however, it is unlikely that the rebels will be able to
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make much of an impact in the air. The rebels’ lack of pilots and technical support
coupled with the fact that the Assad regime possesses radars and long range missiles
means that while the seizure of fighter aircraft is financially damaging to the regime, this
is likely to be the extent of that damage.
In January 2013 JN showcased its geographical reach by attacking the military
intelligence branch of the Quneitra governorate, killing 53 regime soldiers, including 6
officers. 109 The attack is significant not only because of its location in the Golan Heights,
of key security importance to Israel, but also because of the symbolic effect that attacking
the ‘mukhabarat’ (intelligence services) has in Syria.
One of the most significant victories for the rebels and JN occurred on Novermber
5th, 2013, when a joint FSA-JN operation was launched against the Syrian army precinct
in the village of Mahin, south of Homs. The arsenal at this base was considered to be one
of the largest in Syria and when the rebels successfully captured it reports revealed that
they had come into possession of anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers and BM-21 Grad
rockets (122mm rockets fired from a portable truck mounted delivery system).110JN also
displays proficiency in the manufacture and usage of homemade rockets as was seen
during the campaign for al-Qusayr when rockets were fired from Syrian areas into Shi’te
population centers in Lebanon. 111
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Governance of Regions and Control of Infrastructure
While JN’s attacks on governmental facilities in the big cities are intended to sow
chaos and create fear among the Syrian regime and its supporters, attacks in Syria’s rural
regions are intended to cut off administrative units from one another, hit the Syrian
regime’s ability to govern, and give the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel groups control
over territories where they can entrench themselves and prepare for further fighting (they
are referred to as “liberated areas”).112 Using such tactics, the Al-Nusra Front and other
jihadist groups have been able to establish themselves in Syria’s periphery, in the
country’s east and north, and create a situation where they comprise the strongest military
force and the governing organization in some of those areas. To be more specific it is the
governorates of Al-Raqqa, Al Hasakah, Aleppo, Idlib, and Deir ez-Zor that Nusra and its
affiliates are strongest. The group maintains a presence (but not administrative control) in
the Southern provinces of Dara and Al-Sweda, where they are nevertheless engaged in
various forms of social assistance and military operations. The map on the next page is
provided for reference. 113
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Map of Syria’s Provinces

To create an alternative administration to the Syrian regime and gain the support
of the population in various regions that they have captured, the Al-Nusra Front and other
jihadist organizations have taken upon themselves government functions in various
spheres of life: distributing vital food supplies, operating an Islamic justice system and
enforcing law and order. Governance of these regions has been characterized by a notable
ability to maintain law and order, an area in which the FSA has failed. Western reporters
who visited liberated territories said that the local residents were content with the
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situation.114 The FSA, on the other hand, lacking an effective centralized command
structure/treasury, has been unable to prevent its troops from looting, robbing and in
some cases, raping in the areas where it is dominant, a fact that has been of great help to
JN in entrenching itself in regions of Syria. Having cultivated a reputation for discipline
and moral righteousness, JN’s ability to gain legitimate control over areas is an
invaluable asset to Al-Qaeda.
Al-Nusra and its Islamist affiliates’ ability to create alternative governance
mechanisms in such a short period of time is both remarkable and deeply worrying at the
same time. The same process in Afghanistan took the Taliban nearly ten years, and even
then, their draconic rule was despised in spite of the fact that the Taliban managed to
bring law and order back to a country engulfed in civil war. In attempting to analyze and
pinpoint the source of the Islamist’ success in this regard, it is necessary to take stock of
their administrative behavior with respect to region.

Al-Raqqah
According to an investigative report by Reuters in June 2013, Islamist factions in
control of the Al-Raqah governorate manage the city’s public services complete with an
effective court system that handles issues ranging from petty theft to property
registration, financial disputes, and even licensing for import/export to other rebel
areas.115 The fighters launch operations to take control of grain silos which they use to
supply the bakeries they manage, which in turn provide rations to the inhabitants of the
area. The Islamists are also being careful not to over impose their religious ideals on the
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locals; women can move about freely unveiled, the acquisition of alcohol is possible, and
the universities are allowed to run unhindered.116
Of particular importance to Nusra and the Islamic coalition in general is the
hydro-electric dam near the city of Al-Thawra. JN successfully seized this dam in
February 2013 after having seized a smaller dam in the area in a joint operation with the
FSA.117 The rebels use this dam to provide water and electricity to residents, hugely
magnifying their popularity in the region.

Aleppo
JN’s efforts to entrench itself in Aleppo date back to late 2012 when the group
embarked on an intensive relief operation, providing fuel and basic necessities to
residents while also controlling bread prices and persecuting profiteers. 118 In 2013 Nusra
furthered their efforts of aid to locals, engaging in an effort to repair hit power grids and
sewage infrastructure. In addition the group provided low-cost medical care, cleaning
services and agricultural aid to residents.119 Winning the battle for hearts and minds in
Aleppo is of particular importance to JN as it is a central theater for the battle between
rebels and the regime. Aleppo has, since the outbreak of the war, been a hotbed for rebel
activity and anti-regime sentiment, making the sentiment of the locals towards JN a key
factor in the overall effort to gain popularity amongst the opposition. A particularly
important rebel operation in Aleppo was the seizure of Al-Jarrah military airbase in
February 2013, a day after JN and allies took control of the dam at al-Thawra in the AlRaqah governorate.
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Deir-ez Zor
The Deir-ez-Zor governorate, located in North East Syria, is important primarily
because of the border it shares with Iraq, from where a significant amount of weapons
and fighters enter Syria to join the Islamist factions. The Nusra Front is involved in
intense relief activity in the region, supplying food, gas, transportation infrastructure
(bridges), and medical care to residents. 120 Similar reports hold true for Al-Hasakah and
Idlib, where the Nusra Front’s provision of basic services has won them support for the
local residents. It is pertinent to note that JN and its affiliates have exercised great
restraint in meting out harsh punishments in keeping with the tenets of radical Islam
through its Sharia courts. This restraint is driven by a calculated attempt at rebranding the
Islamist factions; the behavior of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan makes people
immediately wary of the idea of Sharia courts, thereby creating the impetus for Nusra and
others to demonstrate a departure from this trend. The longevity of this restraint,
however, is questionable; once these groups become well entrenched (their authority is
unquestioned) they will be far less motivated to exercise restraint on severe punishments.

Control of Vital Infrastructure
Perhaps the most important of JN’s operations is its successful seizure and
management of key infrastructure sites, including some of Syria’s most vital oil and gas
fields. The vast amounts of money JN spends in paying its operatives (more than any
other group), acquiring weapons, and providing relief to the various regions it governs in
tandem with other Islamist factions is a result of its ability to use this infrastructure to
120
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generate revenue. The extent of Nusra’s (and allies) control over some of Syria’s most
important infrastructure is staggering; in 2013 almost all of the oil and gas fields in
eastern and northern Syria were overrun by the rebels. While the fields are run and
secured by a coalition, JN plays the most prominent and authoritative role in their
management.121 The seizure of these oil fields has created a regional market; according to
a report by Reuters thousands of barrels of crude oil are smuggled to Turkey daily by
small tankers using primitive roads. 122
JN’s leadership has been characterized by pragmatism in strategy, and this
pragmatism holds true for their management of oil fields; according to some sources JN
and the regime have reached a tacit agreement with regard to oil. The agreement entails
that the rebels keep oil flowing to the Western parts of the country in exchange for
monthly payments estimated at $1.5 million.123 This would put JN’s annual income,
solely from control of two oil fields, at $18 million. Given that it also generates income
from the sale of large weapons seizures, oil drilling machines, factory equipment,
archaeological relics, vehicles and wheat it is easily the most well financed group
amongst the opposition124. JN also receives separate funding from a host of sources in the
Gulf, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, a fact that makes it one of, if not the most, well
financed Jihadist group in existence today.
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In addition to the dams seized in Al-Raqah, the oil fields seized in the north and
East, and the airbases seized in various regions, JN has also managed to take control of
most of the 17 important border-crossings into Syria, a fact that elevates its level of
influence on the Syrian countryside from notable to comprehensive. In short, in the
recent months, Al Qaeda in Syria has become an organization that governs an area with
several million inhabitants, while it manages the economic activities numbering in
millions of dollars monthly, and, apart from the Syrian Army, it is the “organization” that
maintains the largest and strongest army in Syria.
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4. Implications for Middle Eastern Security and U.S Foreign Policy

The prominence of JN within Syria poses a regional security threat like no other. The
group is ideally positioned in a financial, geographical, and militaristic sense to export
jihad to Lebanon Israel, Europe, and pro-Western Arab countries. Manned by thousands
of well trained, highly disciplined and ideologically committed soldiers who are well
versed in guerilla warfare, bomb making and counter-intelligence, Jabhat-al-Nusra and its
affiliates are now the centerpieces of global jihad. Embroiled in a conflict that has taken
center stage in the international arena, Al-Qaeda is no longer hiding away in the faraway
caves and mountains of Afghanistan, rather it has created a political base with wideranging support in the heart of the Levant.
Projecting the Future Role of JN and Affiliates
The role and significance of Nusra and its affiliates in the future will depend on
the course that the conflict takes from here on. As it currently stands the Assad regime
and rebels are locked in a violent stalemate, with each side jockeying for marginal
victories over the other. The current paralysis is driven by the simple fact that Assad will
do anything to stay in power, and the opposition would never accept a peace deal that
allows him to stay. Neither side is strong enough to win, or weak enough to lose.125 With
his monopoly on air power and support from the Russians and Iranians, Assad feels no
pressure to negotiate with the armed opposition, making it impossible for the
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international community to facilitate a cease-fire. The Assad regime has deliberately
turned the war into a polarized, existential, all or nothing battle in order to rally Syria’s
apolitical Alawites to the regime. The regime, contrary to popular belief, is far from the
verge of collapse. It is well financed, well armed and as of late has had assistance from
specialized Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon. Given that one of Assad’s weaknesses was
a lack of a sufficient amount of loyal soldiers, this influx does much to reinforce the
regime’s ability to endure the opposition. The regime also has Iran’s full backing; Iran
announced a credit facility for Syria in 2013 amounting to $1 billion, which was
increased to $3.6 billion later that year126. Iraq, in a telling sign of increased alignment
with Iran, has allowed for its airspace to be used for the transport of weapons from Iran to
Syria. In addition to Iraqi government support, Iraqi Shia militias are engaged on the
ground in Syria.
The rebels, while unable to wrest control of major cities, have successfully
entrenched themselves in the rural areas, particularly in the north. The Islamist factions
control nearly all major oil and gas fields, two dams, many of the border crossings and
vital supply lines. The rebels, particularly the Nusra Front, are short on neither money nor
fighters, and have the advantage of unfettered access to a seemingly endless stream of
new recruits created by the sectarian nature of the conflict. One area in which the rebels
have no answer for Assad is in his air superiority; a lack of MANPAD’s and heavy
weaponry leaves even the most sophisticated of rebel groups vulnerable to air assault, a
fact that Assad capitalizes on by launching intense bombing campaigns.
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Recent reports suggest that Assad is dependent on the Jihadists factions remaining
at large as it is the greatest deterrent to the West providing other rebels with heavy
weaponry. On an ideological, narrative-building level Assad needs terrorist enemies
allegedly supported by foreign powers like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel and Turkey
because they suit the sense of legitimacy and secular Arab nationalism he wishes to
project and also help justify state repression.127 This means that Assad is likely to
concentrate the brunt of his military energy towards the FSA, as the absolute elimination
(an impossibility at this point anyway) of Jihadist groups would only ease the way for the
West to heavily arm the rebels. The continued presence and prominence of the Nusra
Front in Syria can thus be expected, as can the growth of the group in both numbers and
popularity.

Implications for Middle Eastern Security
Nusra, by virtue of its control over regions in the North, has already created safe
havens for Al-Qaeda that are easily accessible through both Turkey and Iraq. It can be
assumed that Syria will now be used by Al-Qaeda as a center for global jihad and a
launching pad for attacks against Israel. Evidence for this can be found in the fact that on
January 22nd, 2014 Israeli Intelligence announced that it had foiled an Al-Qaeda plot
aimed at carrying out mass-casualty suicide bombings in Israel.128 It is pertinent to note
that while Israel has been forced to engage with Hamas and Hezbollah due to the
geographical proximity of Palestine and Lebanon, the same has not held true for Al-
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Qaeda in the past. Never before has Al-Qaeda been at Israel’s doorstep, a fact that is
likely to induce Israel to further bolster its position in the Golan Heights.
Lebanon is also likely to suffer at the hands of al-Nusra considering that
Hezbollah has entered the conflict in a big way. Having sent a couple of thousand fighters
into Syria to aid the Syrian military, Hezbollah has been key to the regime successfully
rooting out JN and other opposition forces from Yabrud, Al-Qasayr and regions near the
Syrian-Lebanese border. 129 The Nusra Front, having suffered heavy losses at the hands
of specialized Hezbollah light infantry units, has retaliated by attacking Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Since August 2013 JN has launched seven attacks in Hezbollah controlled areas
of Lebanon using suicide bombers and car bombs. 130 Unless there is a fundamental
recalculation of policy by Hezbollah, these attacks are likely to continue which will have
the effect of politically weakening Hezbollah and destabilizing Lebanon. Hezbollah’s
subservience to the Iranian regime is unlikely to allow for any such recalculation, making
its isolation inevitable. Israel stands to benefit most the most from this development,
raising questions as to whether the Mossad has anything to do with the sudden and
mysterious emergence of JN in Lebanon.
The growing numbers of Westerners that are joining the ranks of the Syrian
opposition is a major global security concern, particularly because more often than not,
these Westerners end up fighting with JN. Considering that these individuals have
Western passports, their potential radicalization presents a threat to their home countries.
Of the countries in Europe Britain has the most foreign fighters in Syria, estimated at
anywhere between two to three hundred. Estimates put the number of foreign fighters
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from Western countries at anywhere between 1600 and 2100.131This relatively large
number of fighters poses an international security risk because of their hostility to
Western European values, Syria’s geographical proximity to Europe, the relative
logistical ease of maintaining contact with Al-Qaeda handlers and the legal, political and
societal challenges associated with countering Islamic terrorism in Europe. 132 Countries
like Britain have difficulty in detaining foreign fighters for two reasons, the first being
that the illegality of fighting the Assad regime is not a given unless evidence of
involvement with banned jihadist groups can be found, and secondly because these
foreign fighters hide their final destination, travelling either to Turkey or France before
making the final trip into Syria.133
Another threat posed by Nusra’s presence in Syria is the possibility of advanced
weapons from the regime falling into the hands of Jihadists. Of particular concern is the
possibility of chemical weapons proliferating to the opposition. It is noteworthy that JN
was involved in the rebel seizure of Sheikh Sulayman base, known for being a key
chemical weapons research facility.
The fact that the rebels are firmly in control of the countryside in the north and
east as well as many border-crossings into Iraq and Turkey means that these borders,
especially the Iraqi border, will become increasingly porous over time. The Syrian regime
itself now only controls one official border crossing into Iraq.134 The Iraqi province of
Anbar, host to a Sunni majority sympathetic to the Syrian opposition, has been a vital
source of both fighters and weapons to the rebels. The continued presence and control of
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Islamist factions in this region will result in the increased porousness of the border, a
phenomenon that may eventually lead to its effective disappearance altogether.

Analyzing U.S Policy Toward Syria
U.S/western policy towards Syria has been an unmistakable failure. Noninterventionism in the early stages of the war created a vacuum that has been filled by
Jihadists that will later threaten Western security interests. Not only did western policy
permit the Assad regime to continue oppressing the Sunni majority, it also created the
impetus for regional powers to support/prop up Jihadist outfits operating in the region.
Having missed the window of opportunity to decisively intervene in the conflict, the U.S
has now taken to sticking to an “Assad must go” policy that, more than anything else,
relies on Riyadh and Ankara to continue supporting Jihadists with links to Al-Qaeda.
This policy could be motivated by a combination of factors, some of which are listed
below.
1. Washington is cautious. Syria is unlike either Iraq or Libya as it has powerful
friends in the shape of Iran and Lebanon. Any significant U.S interventionism could lead
to the widening of the war; Hezbollah and Iran could easily retaliate to U.S intervention
by attacking Israel, thereby dragging it into the war and engulfing the whole region into
further intensified conflict.
2. The Obama administration wishes to roll back its presence/involvement in the
Middle East while safeguarding its vital interests in the region. This rollback from the
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region is motivated by the domestically unpopular U.S engagements in Iraq and
Afghanistan coupled with the (disastrous) aftermath of the Libyan intervention. In
addition, the Obama administration wishes to redistribute its military presence/focus from
the Middle East to Asia, in what is being called the Asia-pacific pivot. The U.S’s
remaining vital interests in the Middle East lie in keeping the flow of oil undisrupted so
as to prevent shocks to the global economy and countering/containing Iran’s sphere of
influence in the region. In other words, the U.S is happy to take a step back and let
regional powers flesh it out in a proxy war so long as oil keeps flowing and Iran’s designs
are being resisted (in this case through jihadist groups).
3. The U.S, cognizant of the fact that regional powers would end up arming the
rebels regardless of U.S involvement, wished to place itself in a consultative role that
would allow it to vet the groups receiving arms, thereby enabling it to take steps to
prevent Jihadists acquiring those weapons.
As far as factor 3 is concerned, the U.S has either failed to effectively prevent
jihadists from acquiring weapons intended for the FSA, or it is deliberately placing its
bets on (and allowing weapons to flow to) the jihadist groups in the hope that their
superior military skill will hasten the fall of the regime. The latter, if true, represents the
most strategically incoherent and short sighted policy to have originated in Washington
since the arming of the Mujahideen.
With regard to factor 2, if the U.S is truly experimenting with a policy based on
regional powers like Saudi Arabia supporting proxy militias against Iran, then this
experiment has failed because it has not at all undermined Iran’s regional position. If
anything, Iran’s position has been elevated by the vacuum created by the U.S’s decision
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to grant regional powers a greater role in managing the area. The presence of SalafiJihadist groups in Syria and the Levant in general gives Iran license to counter these
groups with their own proxies, such as Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shia militias active in
Syria. While Saudi Arabian Intelligence is no stranger to proxy warfare, it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which it bests the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, renowned world
over for its mastery in proxy warfare. The cautious U.S approach to Syria, aimed at
preventing the widening of the war, has ironically ended up doing just that; Hezbollah’s
entrance into the war at Iran’s behest will now embroil Lebanon in the conflict, a
development that will threaten the long-term stability of the region.
Implications/ U.S Policy Recommendations
U.S policy towards Syria up till now has failed on almost all counts, backfiring at
every step, complicating any progress towards the resolution of the conflict. In charting
out a maximalist demand for Assad’s removal, the U.S and its European partners have
greatly reduced, if not irreparably damaged, the prospects for a negotiated resolution of
the conflict. The overwhelming prominence of Jihadi factions in Syria, which could have
been prevented by the timely organization/armament of the FSA in 2012, is now a given
factor that must be accounted for in the future. In formulating future policy U.S decision
makers must be cognizant of another factor that has now become a given: it will be
impossible to bring about a political settlement in Syria without altering the military
balance to some extent, simply because the Assad regime feels no obligation to negotiate
so long as it is backed by Iran and Russia and can maintain its aerial superiority over the
opposition. Keeping this in mind, the U.S faces some distinct options in proceeding with
its policy with regard to Damascus, listed below.
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The first of these options is to decisively launch an immediate effort to arm,
finance and train moderate elements of the FSA in an effort to alter the military balance
and hasten the fall of the Assad regime. This would involve giving the rebels heavy
weaponry and ideally, some form of air-support. This option is unviable because firstly,
there are almost no ‘moderates’ in the FSA with the prerequisite military influence and
on ground presence to effectively use any weapons that the U.S might decide to supply.
In addition, the U.S would risk Iran and Lebanon deciding to upscale their involvement in
the war by overtly arming the FSA.
The second option is for the U.S to wait for the Assad regime to topple, and then
begin supporting the FSA. This policy avoids the risk of weapons falling into Jihadist
hands, as once the common goal of Assad’s removal is achieved, Jihadist groups and the
FSA will very likely turn against each other, thereby providing the U.S with an
opportunity to marginalize Al-Qaeda without having to put boots on the ground. This
option is unfortunately contingent on the Assad regime somehow toppling without the
rebels being further armed, a situation that seems highly unlikely in the wake of recent
events. This option also assumes that the U.S wants to remain heavily involved in Syria
beyond Assad’s removal, an assumption that does not stand up to the realities of the
U.S’s effort to extricate itself from heavy involvement the region.
A third option is to do nothing and allow regional powers like Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Jordan, and Qatar to take the reins with regard to Syria. This option most closely
represents the stance currently taken by the U.S and allows the U.S much more political
space with which to pursue its other geopolitical interests. The Obama Administration’s
hopes for improved Iranian-American relations are one of these interests, one that will be
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greatly aided by a policy of detachment from Syria. Yet a policy of complete detachment
from Syria will lead to regional powers continuing support for proxies against one
another, thereby elongating the war and throwing into question the long-term stability of
the entire region. A do nothing policy will also be perceived in the Muslim world as the
U.S abandonment of Muslims in need, and will be used by Jihadist clerics as a sticking
point in their vilification of the U.S.
Thus it is my recommendation that the U.S pursue a policy that is a combination
of the second and third option; allow regional players a greater role in managing the
opposition while preparing to engage Syrian civil society and the FSA in a post Assad
future. This recommendation is based on the assumption that the military balance needs
to be altered in order for the regime to topple, and that the only forces within the
opposition militarily capable of toppling the regime are the Jihadists. Neither can the U.S
afford to be seen as a direct supplier of weapons to Jihadist factions nor can it ignore the
fact that they are the only realistic means by which to hasten the removal of Assad. To
complicate matters, the U.S needs to marginalize Al-Qaeda in Syria if and when the
Assad regime topples. Thus the U.S should currently assume a preparatory role that is
aimed at assisting Syria’s neighbors with their capabilities relating to border security and
refugee relief. This will help in mitigating the negative effects of the militarization of the
region, while simultaneously providing the U.S with time to identify, vet, train and
politically engage legitimate members of the Syrian opposition so that when the time
comes, these groups are in a position to make a difference. Rather than generate new
enemies, present policy should focus on augmenting the capacity of friendly actors and if
possible, seeking and training more recruits for their cause. Crucial to this effort will be a
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broader engagement with Syrian civil society, planning for reform of post-conflict
security institutions and the upgrading of western support to the Syrian political process.

Conclusions
The emergence of Al-Qaeda in Syria was understandable if not inevitable;
Al-Qaeda has suffered significant losses in Pakistan, where the CIA and Pakistan’s InterServices-Intelligence captured or killed 23 of its top 24 operatives (including OBL). It
has been all but driven out of Iraq, where it received backlash from the local populace
and has lost much of the support/acceptance it once enjoyed. In Yemen the group has
been effectively targeted by the U.S through the use of drone strikes, causing further
disruption to its operations. Under this pressure some Al-Qaeda members had taken to
hiding/shifting to North Africa, a fact that was interpreted by western analysts as a sign of
Al-Qaeda’s decline.
The emergence of Jabhat-al-Nusra in Syria must thus be contextualized within AlQaeda’s prevailing predicament; it is a deliberate attempt to create a new safe haven in
the absence of those previously enjoyed and also an opportunity to rebrand itself by
playing to the popular tune of a Sunni led revolution in Syria. Al-Nusra’s battle to ‘win
hearts and mind’ is evidence of this conscious ‘rebranding’ effort by Al-Qaeda and can
be recognized in Nusra’s exercise of restraint in meting out harsh punishments, high
emphasis on relief/social work, and avoidance (when possible) of conflict with other
groups. Engaged in battle not only with the regime but also with Hezbollah, JN has
placed itself at the center of a sectarian proxy war and now acts as the lynchpin of the
Sunni side. Al-Qaeda, far from having been defeated in the GWOT, is now master and
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commander of swathes of territory that harbor millions of people. The sectarian nature of
the conflict has allowed for it to mesh into a larger opposition that is seen by the majority
of the international community as legitimate and worthy of support. This is dangerous not
only because of the security risks that a jihadist network firmly entrenched in Syria poses,
but also because the polarized environment in Syria, brought on by the sectarian nature of
the conflict, is conducive to mass radicalization. Jihadist groups like the Nusra Front are
being received with praise and admiration, their achievements lauded and popularized,
and their ranks being joined by local and foreign fighters alike. Never before has AlQaeda been so mainstream, so acceptable or so well received. Never before has a call to
jihad yielded the influx of so many Muslim fighters, from so many different countries, in
such a short period of time.
The implications of this are dire; the security dynamic of the Middle East is bound
to take a decisive turn for the worse with Syria serving as a jihadist hotbed. The border
agreements of 1916, charted out by Sykes-Picot, are likely to come under question as the
porousness of the rebel held Iraqi-Syria border crossings begins to take effect. Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey will all become victims, to some extent, of the
spillover effects of the war while Iran will continue to vie for regional influence through
proxy warfare. That Syria has become the central theater for Sunni vs. Shia conflict is in
many ways advantageous to the U.S at a time where it is attempting to disentangle itself
from the region. Considering that the U.S is at odds with both Iran and hardcore Salafi
Jihadists it is strategically advisable for them to let this conflict continue indefinitely so
as to maximize the weakening of both sides. From a moralistic and humanitarian point of
view however, the cost of letting the conflict continue unhindered is unacceptably high.
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U.S policymakers must thus strive to find an acceptable balance between realpolitik and
humanistic responsibility in tackling the Syrian quagmire.
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